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Abstract
Providers of online marketplaces are constantly combatting against problematic
transactions, such as selling illegal items and posting fictive items, exercised by some of
their users. A typical approach to detect fraud activity has been to analyze registered
user profiles, user’s behavior, and texts attached to individual transactions and the user.
However, this traditional approach may be limited because malicious users can easily
conceal their information. Given this background, network indices have been exploited
for detecting frauds in various online transaction platforms. In the present study, we
analyzed networks of users of an online consumer-to-consumer marketplace in which a
seller and the corresponding buyer of a transaction are connected by a directed edge.
We constructed egocentric networks of each of several hundreds of fraudulent users and
those of a similar number of normal users. We calculated eight local network indices
based on up to connectivity between the neighbors of the focal node. Based on the
present descriptive analysis of these network indices, we fed twelve features that we
constructed from the eight network indices to random forest classifiers with the aim of
distinguishing between normal users and fraudulent users engaged in each one of the
four types of problematic transactions. We found that the classifier accurately
distinguished the fraudulent users from normal users and that the classification
performance did not depend on the type of problematic transaction.
Introduction
In tandem with the rapid growth of online and electronic transactions and
communications, fraud is expanding at a dramatic speed and penetrates our daily lives.
Fraud including cybercrimes costs billions of dollars per year and threatens the security
of our society [1, 2]. In particular, in the recent era where online activity dominates,
attacking a system is not too costly, whereas defending the system against fraud is
costly [3]. The dimension of fraud is vast and ranges from credit card fraud, money
laundering, computer intrusion, to plagiarism, to name a few.
Computational and statistical methods for detecting and preventing fraud have been
developed and implemented for decades [4–7]. Standard practice for fraud detection is
to employ statistical methods including the case of machine learning algorithms. In
particular, when both fraudulent and non-fraudulent samples are available, one can
construct a classifier via supervised learning [4–7]. Exemplar features to be fed to such
a statistical classifier include the transaction amount, day of the week, item category,
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and user’s address for detecting frauds in credit card systems, number of calls, call
duration, call type, and user’s age, gender, and geographical region in the case of
telecommunication, and user profiles and transaction history in the case of online
auctions [6].
However, many of these features can be easily faked by advanced fraudsters [8, 9].
Furthermore, fraudulent users are adept at escaping the eyes of the administrators or
authorities that would detect the usage of particular words as a signature of anomalous
behavior [10–12]. For example, if the authority discovers that one jargon means a drug,
then fraudulent users may easily switch to another jargon to confuse the authority.
Network analysis is an alternative way to construct features and is not new to fraud
detection techniques [8, 13]. The idea is to use connectivity between nodes, which are
usually users or goods, in the given data and calculate graph-theoretic quantities or
scores that characterize nodes. These methods stand on the expectation that anomalous
users show connectivity patterns that are distinct from those of normal users [8].
Network analysis has been deployed for fraud detection in insurance [14], money
laundering [15–17], health-care data [18], car-booking [19], a social security system [20],
mobile advertising [21], a mobile phone network [22], online social networks [23–26],
online review forums [27–29], online auction or marketplaces [30–34], credit card
transactions [35,36], cryptocurrency transaction [37], and various other fields [38]. For
example, fraudulent users and their accomplices were shown to form approximately
bipartite cores in a network of users to inflate their reputations in an online auction
system [30]. Then, the authors proposed an algorithm based on a belief propagation to
detect such suspicious connectivity patterns. This method has been proven to be also
effective on empirical data obtained from eBay [31].
In the present study, we analyze a data set obtained from a large online
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) marketplace, Mercari, operating in Japan and the US.
They are the largest C2C marketplace in Japan, in which, as of 2019, there are 13
million monthly active users and 133 billion yen (approximately 1.2 billion USD)
transactions per quarter year [39]. Note that we analyze transaction frauds based on
transaction networks of users, which contrasts with previous studies of online C2C
marketplaces that looked at reputation frauds [30–32,34]. Many prior network-based
fraud detection algorithms used global information about networks, such as connected
components, communities, betweenness, k-cores, and that determined by belief
propagation [14–33,35,36]. Others used local information about the users’ network,
such as the degree, the number of triangles, and the local clustering
coefficient [14–16,20,23,30,33,34,37,38]. We will focus on local features of users, i.e.,
features of a node that can be calculated from the connectivity of the user and the
connectivity between neighbors of the user. This is because local features are easier and
faster to calculate and thus practical for commercial implementations.
Materials and methods
Data
Mercari is an online C2C marketplace service, where users trade various items among
themselves. The service is operating in Japan and the United States. In the present
study, we used the data obtained from the Japanese market. In addition to normal
transactions, we focused on the following types of problematic transactions: fictive,
underwear, medicine, and weapon. Fictive transactions are defined as attempts to sell
non-existing items. Underwear refers to transactions of used underwear; they are
prohibited by the service from the perspective of morality and hygiene. Medicine refers
to transactions of medicinal supplies, which are prohibited by the law. Weapon refers to
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transactions of weapons, which are prohibited by the service because they may lead to
crime. The number of sampled users of each type is shown in Table 1.
Network analysis
We examine a directed and weighted network of users in which a user corresponds to a
node and an attempted transaction between two users represents a directed edge. The
weight of the edge is equal to the number of attempted transactions by the seller with
the buyer. We constructed egocentric networks of each of several hundreds of normal
users and those of fraudulent users, i.e., those engaged in at least one problematic
transaction. The egocentric network of either a normal or fraudulent user contained the
nodes neighboring the focal user, edges between the focal user and these neighbors, and
edges between the pairs of these neighbors.
We calculated eight indices for each focal node. They are local indices in the
meaning that they require the information up to the connectivity among the neighbors
of the focal node.
Five out of the eight indices use only the information about the connectivity of the
focal node. The degree ki of node vi is the number of its neighbors. The node
strength [40] (i.e., weighted degree) of node vi, denoted by si, is the number of
transactions in which vi is involved. Using these two indices, we also considered the
mean number of transactions per neighbor, i.e., si/ki, as a separate index. These three
indices do not use information about the direction of edges.
The sell probability of node vi, denoted by SPi, uses the information about the
direction of edges and defined as the proportion of the vi’s neighbors for which vi acts
as seller. Precisely, the sell probability is given by
SPi =
kouti
kini + k
out
i
, (1)
where kini is vi’s in-degree (i.e., the number of neighbors from whom vi attempted to
buy at least one item) and kouti is vi’s out-degree (i.e., the number of neighbors to
whom vi attempted to sell at least one item). It should be noted that, if vi acted as
both seller and buyer towards vj , the contribution of vj to both in- and out-degree of vi
is equal to one. Therefore, kini + k
out
i is not equal to ki in general.
The weighted version of the sell probability, denoted by WSPi, is defined as
WSPi =
souti
sini + s
out
i
, (2)
where sini is node vi’s weighted in-degree (i.e., the number of attempted buys) and s
out
i
is vi’s weighted out-degree (i.e., the number of attempted sells).
The other three indices are based on triangles that involve the focal node. The local
clustering coefficient Ci quantifies the abundance of undirected and unweighted
triangles around vi [41]. It is defined as the number of undirected and unweighted
triangles including vi divided by ki(ki − 1)/2. The local clustering coefficient Ci ranges
between 0 and 1.
We hypothesized that triangles contributing to an increase in the local clustering
coefficient are localized around particular neighbors of node vi. Such neighbors together
with vi may form an overlapping set of triangles, which may be regarded as a
community [42, 43]. Therefore, our hypothesis implies that the extent to which the focal
node is involved in communities should be different between normal and fraudulent
users. To quantify this concept, we introduce the so-called triangle congregation,
denoted by mi. It is defined as the extent to which two triangles involving vi share
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Fig 1. Directed triangle patterns and their count. (a) Feedforward triangle. (b)
Cyclic triangle. (c)–(f) Four three-node patterns that contain directed triangles and
reciprocal edges. The numbers shown in the figure represent the number of feedforward
or cyclic triangles to which each three-node pattern contributes.
another node and is given by
mi =
(Number of pairs of triangles involving vi that share another node)
Tri(Tri − 1)/2 , (3)
where Tri = Ciki(ki − 1)/2 is the number of triangles involving vi. Note that mi ranges
between 0 and 1.
Frequencies of different directed three-node subnetworks, conventionally known as
network motifs [44], may distinguish between normal and fraudulent users. In
particular, among triangles composed of directed edges, we hypothesized that
feedforward triangles (Fig. 1a) should be natural and that cyclic triangles (Fig. 1b) are
not. We hypothesized so because a natural interpretation of a feedforward triangle is
that a node with out-degree two tends to serve as seller while that with out-degree zero
tends to serve as buyer and there are many such nodes that use the marketplace mostly
as buyer or seller but not both. In contrast, an abundance of cyclic triangles may imply
that relatively many users use the marketplace as both buyer and seller. We used the
index called the cycle probability, denoted by CYPi, which is defined by
CYPi =
CYi
FFi + CYi
, (4)
where FFi and CYi are the numbers of feedforward triangles and cyclic triangles to
which node vi belongs. The definition of FFi and CYi, and hence CYPi, is valid even
when the triangles involving vi have bidirectional edges. In the case of Fig. 1c, for
example, any of the three nodes contains one feedforward triangle and one cyclic
triangle. The other three cases in which bidirectional edges are involved in triangles are
shown in Figs. 1d-f. In the calculation of CYPi, we ignored the weights of edges.
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Random forest classifier
To classify users into normal and fraudulent users based on their local network
properties, we employed a random forest classifier [45–47] implemented in
scikit-learn [48]. It uses an ensemble learning method that combines multiple classifiers,
each of which is a decision tree, built from training data and classifies test data avoiding
overfitting. We combined 300 decision-tree classifiers to construct a random forest
classifier. Each decision tree is constructed on the basis of training samples that are
randomly subsampled with replacement from the set of all the training samples. To
compute the best split of each node in a tree, one randomly samples the candidate
features from the set of all the features. The probability that a test sample is positive in
a tree is estimated as follows. Consider the terminal node in the tree that a test sample
eventually reaches. The fraction of positive training samples at the terminal node gives
the probability that the test sample is classified as positive. One minus the positive
probability gives the negative probability estimated for the same test sample. The
positive or negative probability for the random forest classifier is obtained as the
average of single-tree positive or negative probability over all the 300 trees. A sample is
classified as positive by the random forest classifier if the positive probability is larger
than 0.5, otherwise classified as negative.
There were more normal users than any one type of fraudulent user. Therefore, to
balance the number of the negative (i.e., normal) and positive (i.e., fraudulent) samples,
we uniformly randomly subsampled the negative samples such that the number of the
samples is the same between the normal and fraudulent types. Then, we split samples
of each type into two sets such that 75% and 25% of the samples of each type are
assigned to the training and test samples, respectively. Based on the training sample
constructed in this manner, we built each of the 300 decision trees and hence a random
forest classifier. Then, we examined the classification performance of the random forest
classifier on the set of test samples.
The true positive rate, also called the recall, is defined as the proportion of the
positive samples (i.e., fraudulent users) that the random forest classifier correctly
classifies as positive. The false positive rate is defined as the proportion of the negative
samples (i.e., normal users) that are incorrectly classified as positive. The precision is
defined as the proportion of the truly positive samples among those that are classified as
positive. The true positive rate, false positive rate, and precision range between 0 and 1.
We used the following two performance measures for the random forest classifier. To
draw the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for a random forest classifier,
one first arranges the test samples in descending order of the estimated probability that
they are positive. Then, one plots each test sample, with its false positive rate on the
horizontal axis and the true positive rate on the vertical axis. By connecting the test
samples in a piecewise linear manner, one obtains the ROC curve. The precision-recall
(PR) curve is generated by plotting the samples in the same order in [0, 1]2, with the
recall on the horizontal axis and the precision on the vertical axis. For an accurate
binary classifier, both ROC and PR curves visit near (x, y) = (0, 1). Therefore, we
quantify the performance of the classifier by the area under the curve (AUC) of each
curve. The AUC ranges between 0 and 1, and a large value indicates a good
performance of the random forest classifier.
To calculate the importance of each feature in the random forest classifier, we used
the permutation importance [49,50]. With this method, the importance of a feature is
given by the decrease in the performance of the trained classifier when the feature is
randomly permuted among the test samples. A large value indicates that the feature
considerably contributes to the performance of the classifier. To calculate the
permutation importance, we used the AUC value of the ROC curve as the performance
measure of a random forest classifier. We computed the permutation importance of each
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feature with ten different permutations and adopted the average over the ten
permutations as the importance of the feature.
We optimized the parameters of the random forest classifier by a grid search with
10-fold cross-validation on the training set. For the maximum depth of each tree (i.e.,
the max depth parameter in scikit-learn), we explored the integers between 3 and 10.
For the number of candidate features for each split (i.e., max features), we explored the
integers between 3 and 6. For the minimum number of samples required at terminal
nodes (i.e., min samples leaf), we explored 1, 3, and 5. As mentioned above, the number
of trees (i.e., n estimators) was set to 300. The seed number for the random number
generator (i.e., random state) was set to 0. For the other hyperparameters, we used the
default values in scikit-learn version 0.20.3. In the parameter optimization, we evaluated
the performance of the random forest classifier with the AUC value of the ROC curve
measured on a single set of training and test samples.
To avoid sampling bias, we built 100 random forest classifiers, trained each classifier,
and tested its performance on a randomly drawn set of train and test samples, whose
sampling scheme was described above.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The survival probability of the degree (i.e., a fraction of nodes whose degree is larger
than a specified value) is shown in Fig. 2a for each user type. Approximately 60% of the
normal users have degree ki = 1, whereas the fraction of the users with ki = 1 is
approximately equal to 2% or less for any type of fraudulent user (Table 1). Therefore,
we expect that whether ki = 1 or ki ≥ 2 gives useful information for distinguishing
between normal and fraudulent users. The degree distribution at ki ≥ 2 may provide
further information useful for the classification. The survival probability of the degree
distribution conditioned on ki ≥ 2 for the different types of users is shown in Fig. 2b.
The figure suggests that the degree distribution is systematically different between the
normal and fraudulent users. However, we consider that the difference is not as
clear-cut as that in the fraction of users having ki = 1 (Table 1).
The survival probability of the node strength (i.e., weighted degree) is shown in
Fig. 2c for each user type. As in the case for the unweighted degree, we found that
many normal users, but not fraudulent users, have si = 1. In fact, the number of the
normal users with si = 1 is equal to those with ki = 1 (Table 1), implying that all
normal users with ki = 1 participated in just one transaction. In contrast, no user had
si = 1 for any type of fraudulent user. The survival probability of the node strength
conditioned on si ≥ 2 apparently does not show a clear distinction between the normal
and fraudulent users (Fig. 2d, Table 1).
The distribution of the average number of transactions per edge, i.e., si/ki, is shown
in Fig. 3a. We found that a majority of normal users have si/ki = 1. This result
indicates that a large fraction of normal users is engaged in just one transaction per
neighbor (Table 1). This result is consistent with the fact that approximately 60% of the
normal users have ki = si = 1. In contrast, many of any type of fraudulent users tend to
have a larger value of si/ki than the normal users. Therefore, multiple transactions with
a neighbor seem to be a characteristic behavior for fraudulent users. These results did
not qualitatively change when we discarded the users with si/ki = 1 (Fig. 3b, Table 1).
The distribution of the unweighted sell probability for the different user types is
shown in Fig. 4a. The distribution for the normal users is peaked around 0 and 1,
indicating that a relatively large fraction of normal users is exclusive buyer or seller.
Note that, by definition, the sell probability is at least 1/ki because our samples are
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sellers. Therefore, a peak around the sell probability of zero implies that the users
probably have no or few sell transactions apart from the one sell transaction based on
which the users have been sampled as seller. In contrast, the distribution for any
fraudulent type is relatively flat. Figure 4b shows the relationships between the
unweighted sell probability and the degree. On the dashed line in Fig. 4b, the sell
probability is equal to 1/ki, indicating that the node has k
out
i = 1, which is the smallest
possible out-degree. The users on this line were buyers in all but one transaction.
Figure 4b indicates that a majority of such users are normal as opposed to fraudulent
users, which is quantitatively confirmed in Table 1. We also found that most of the
normal users were either on the horizontal line with the sell probability of one (43.2% of
the normal users with ki ≥ 2; see Table 1 for the corresponding fractions of normal
users with ki = 1) or on the dashed line (29.5%). This is not the case for any type of
fraudulent user (Table 1).
The distribution of the weighted sell probability for the different user types and the
relationships between the weighted sell probability and the node strength are shown in
Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d, respectively. The results are similar to the case of the unweighted
Table 1. Properties of different types of users. In the first column, mean(A | B), for example, represents the mean of
A conditioned on B. Unless the first column mentions the conditional mean or median, the numbers reported in the table
represent the number of users.
Normal Fictive Underwear Medicine Weapon
Total 999 450 469 473 419
ki = 1 587 (58.8%) 10 (2.2%) 1 (0.2%) 4 (0.8%) 3 (0.7%)
mean(ki | ki ≥ 2) 195.0 136.8 296.9 184.4 178.6
median(ki | ki ≥ 2) 77.5 59.5 169.0 97.0 84.0
si = 1 587 (58.8%) 0 0 0 0
mean(si | si ≥ 2) 371.1 281.5 618.2 383.5 349.3
median(si | si ≥ 2) 89.0 113.0 310.0 187.0 148.0
si ≥ 2 412 450 469 473 419
si/ki = 1 97 (23.5%) 0 0 1 (0.2%) 0
mean(si/ki | si/ki > 1) 1.428 2.467 2.27 2.191 2.139
median(si/ki | si/ki > 1) 1.129 1.912 1.797 1.767 1.738
ki ≥ 2 412 440 468 469 416
SPi = 1 157 (38.1%) 21 (4.8%) 22 (4.7%) 18 (3.8%) 20 (4.8%)
SPi = 1/ki 116 (28.2%) 15 (3.4%) 4 (0.9%) 8 (1.7%) 12 (2.9%)
si ≥ 2 412 450 469 473 419
WSPi = 1 157 (38.1%) 31 (6.9%) 23 (4.9%) 22 (4.7%) 23 (5.5%)
WSPi = 1/si 118 (28.6%) 0 0 0 0
ki ≥ 2 412 440 468 469 416
Ci = 0 118 (28.6%) 160 (36.4%) 111 (23.7%) 156 (33.3%) 133 (32.0%)
mean(Ci | Ci > 0) 8.554× 10−3 7.742× 10−3 9.298× 10−4 2.037× 10−3 3.576× 10−3
median(Ci | Ci > 0) 2.411× 10−3 2.016× 10−3 5.216× 10−4 6.324× 10−4 1.282× 10−3
Tri ≥ 2 262 241 317 251 244
mi = 0 17 (6.5%) 27 (11.2%) 54 (17.0%) 44 (17.5%) 32 (13.1%)
mi = 1 12 (4.6%) 9 (3.7%) 4 (1.3%) 6 (2.4%) 11 (4.5%)
mean(mi | mi > 0) 8.554× 10−3 7.742× 10−3 9.298× 10−4 2.037× 10−3 3.576× 10−3
median(mi | mi > 0) 2.411× 10−3 2.016× 10−3 5.216× 10−4 6.324× 10−4 1.282× 10−3
FFi + CYi ≥ 1 294 280 357 313 283
CYPi = 0 234 (79.6%) 183 (65.4%) 228 (63.9%) 224 (71.6%) 206 (72.8%)
mean(CYPi | CYPi > 0) 1.975× 10−2 8.188× 10−2 5.018× 10−2 6.986× 10−2 5.128× 10−2
median(CYPi | CYPi > 0) 1.581× 10−2 4.651× 10−2 3.393× 10−2 3.376× 10−2 2.778× 10−2
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Fig 2. Survival probability of the degree for each user type. (a) Degree (i.e.,
ki) for all nodes. (b) Degree for the nodes with ki ≥ 2. (c) Strength (i.e., si) for all
nodes. (d) Strength for the nodes with si ≥ 2.
sell probability in two aspects. First, the normal users and the fraudulent users form
distinct frequency distributions (Fig. 4c). Second, most of the normal users are either
on the horizontal line with the weighted sell probability of one or on the dashed line
with the smallest possible weighted sell probability, i.e., 1/si (Fig. 4d, Table 1).
The survival probability of the local clustering coefficient is shown in Fig. 5a. It
should be noted that, in this analysis, we confined ourselves to the users with ki ≥ 2
because Ci is undefined when ki = 1. We found that the number of users with Ci = 0 is
not considerably different between the normal and fraudulent users (also see Table 1).
Figure 5b shows the survival probability of Ci conditioned on Ci > 0. The normal users
tend to have a larger value of Ci than fraudulent users, whereas this tendency is not
strong (Table 1).
The survival probability of the triangle congregation is shown in Fig. 6a. Contrary to
our hypothesis, there is no clear difference between the distribution of the normal and
fraudulent users. The triangle congregation tends to be large when the node strength is
small (Fig. 6b) and the local clustering coefficient is large (Fig. 6d). It depends little on
the weighted sell probability (Fig. 6c). However, we did not find clear differences in the
triangle congregation between the normal and fraudulent users (also see Table 1).
The survival probability of the cycle probability is shown in Fig. 7a. A large fraction
of any type of users has CYPi = 0 (Table 1). When the users with CYPi = 0 are
discarded, the normal users tend to have a smaller value of CYPi than any type of
fraudulent users (Fig. 7b, Table 1).
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Fig 3. Survival probability of the average number of transactions per
neighbor. (a) si/ki for all nodes. (b) si/ki for the nodes with si/ki > 1.
Classification of users
Based on the eight indices whose descriptive statistics were analyzed in the previous
section, we defined 12 features and fed them to the random forest classifier. The aim of
the classifier is to distinguish between normal and fraudulent users. The first feature is
binary and whether the degree ki = 1 or ki ≥ 2. The second feature is also binary and
whether the node strength si = 1 or si ≥ 2. The third feature is si/ki, which is a real
number greater than or equal to 1. The fourth feature is binary and whether the
unweighted sell probability SPi = 1 or SPi < 1. The fifth feature is binary and whether
SPi = 1/ki or SPi > 1/ki. The sixth feature is SPi, which ranges between 0 and 1. The
seventh feature is binary and whether the weighted sell probability WSPi = 1 or
WSPi < 1. The eighth feature is binary and whether WSPi = 1/si or WSPi > 1/si.
The ninth feature is WSPi, which ranges between 0 and 1. The tenth feature is the
local clustering coefficient Ci, which ranges between 0 and 1. When ki = 1, the local
clustering coefficient is undefined. In this case, we set Ci = −1. The eleventh feature is
the triangle congregation mi, which ranges between 0 and 1. When there is no triangle
or only one triangle involving vi, one cannot calculate mi. In this case, we set mi = −1.
Finally, the twelfth feature is the cycle probability CYPi, which ranges between 0 and 1.
When there is neither feedforward nor cyclic triangle involving vi, CYPi is undefined.
In this case, we set CYPi = −1.
The ROC and PR curves when all the 12 features of users are used and the
fraudulent type is fictive transactions are shown in Figs. 8a and b, respectively. Each
thin line corresponds to one of the 100 classifiers. The thick lines correspond to the
average of the 100 lines. The dashed lines correspond to the uniformly random
classification. Figure 8 indicates that the classification performance seems to be high.
Quantitatively, for this and the other types of fraudulent users, the AUC values always
exceeded 0.98 (Table 2).
The importance of each feature in the classifier is shown in Fig. 9a, separately for
the different fraud types. The importance of each feature is similar across the different
types of fraud. Figure 9a indicates that the average number of transactions per
neighbor (i.e., si/ki), the sell probability (i.e., SPi), and whether the weighted sell
probability is equal to 1/si (i.e., WSPi = 1/si) are the three features of the highest
importance. In particular, si/ki is by far the most dominant in importance. Given the
results of the descriptive statistics in the previous section, a large value of si/ki, a small
sell probability, and WSPi 6= 1/si strongly suggest that the user may be fraudulent.
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Fig 4. Sell probability for each user type. (a) Distribution of the unweighted sell
probability. (b) Relationship between the degree and the unweighted sell probability. (c)
Distribution of the weighted sell probability. (d) Relationship between the node
strength and the weighted sell probability. The dashed lines in (b) and (d) indicate 1/ki
and 1/si, respectively.
Figure 9a also suggests that the features based on the triangles, i.e., Ci, mi, and
CYPi, are not strong contributors to the classifier’s performance. Because these
features are the only ones that require the information about the connectivity between
pairs of neighbors of the focal node, it is practically beneficial if one can realize a similar
classification performance without using these features; then only the information on
the connectivity of the focal users is required. To explore this possibility, we constructed
the random forest classifier using the nine out of the twelve features that do not require
the connectivity between neighbors of the focal node. The mean AUC values for the
ROC and PR curves are shown in Table 2. We find that, despite some reduction in the
performance scores relative to the case of the classifier using all the 12 features, the
AUC values with the nine features are still large, all exceeding 0.96. The permutation
importance of the nine features is shown in Fig. 9b. The results are similar to those
Table 2. AUC values for the random forest classifiers. The average and
standard deviation were calculated based on the 100 classifiers.
Fictive Underwear Medicine Weapon
12 features
ROC 0.994 ± 0.005 0.995 ± 0.004 0.993 ± 0.004 0.983 ± 0.007
PR 0.993 ± 0.007 0.993 ± 0.008 0.991 ± 0.007 0.981 ± 0.010
9 features
ROC 0.989 ± 0.006 0.987 ± 0.006 0.986 ± 0.006 0.973 ± 0.011
PR 0.986 ± 0.009 0.983 ± 0.011 0.982 ± 0.011 0.964 ± 0.018
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Fig 5. Local clustering coefficient for each user type. (a) Survival probability.
(b) Survival probability conditioned on Ci > 0.
when all the 12 features are used (Fig. 9a).
More than half of the normal users have ki = 1, and there are few fraudulent users
with ki = 1 in each fraud category (Table 1). The classification between the normal and
fraudulent users may be an easy problem for this reason, leading to the large AUC
values. To exclude this possibility, we carried out a classification test for the subdata in
which the normal and fraudulent users with ki = 1 were excluded, leaving 412 normal
users and a similar number of fraudulent users in each category (Table 1). We did not
carry out subsampling because the number of the negative and positive samples were
similar. Instead, we generated 100 different sets of train and test samples and built a
classifier based on each set of train and test samples. The AUC values when either 10 or
7 features (i.e., the features excluding whether or not ki = 1 and whether or not si = 1)
are used are shown in Table 3. The table indicates that the AUC values are still
competitively large while they are smaller than those when whether or not ki = 1 and
whether or not si = 1 are used as features (Table 2).
Discussion
We showed that a random forest classifier using network features of users distinguished
different types of fraudulent users from normal users with approximately 0.98–0.99 in
terms of the AUC. We only used the information about local transaction networks
centered around focal users to synthesize their features. We did so because it is better
in practice not to demand the information about global transaction networks due to the
large number of users. It should be noted that AUC values of ≈ 0.96–0.99 was also
realized when we only used the information about the connectivity of the focal user, not
the connectivity between the neighbors of the focal user. This result has a practical
Table 3. AUC values for the random forest classifiers excluding users with
ki = 1. The average and standard deviation were calculated based on the 100 classifiers.
Fictive Underwear Medicine Weapon
10 features
ROC 0.985 ± 0.006 0.987 ± 0.007 0.986 ± 0.007 0.975 ± 0.009
PR 0.983 ± 0.009 0.984 ± 0.011 0.985 ± 0.010 0.969 ± 0.014
7 features
ROC 0.970 ± 0.009 0.965 ± 0.011 0.967 ± 0.011 0.952 ± 0.013
PR 0.968 ± 0.013 0.960 ± 0.017 0.963 ± 0.017 0.940 ± 0.023
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Fig 6. Triangle congregation for each user type. (a) Survival probability. (b)
Relationship between the triangle congregation, mi, and the node strength. (c)
Relationship between mi and the weighted sell probability. (d) Relationship between mi
and the local clustering coefficient.
advantage when the present fraud-detection method is implemented online because it
allows one to classify users with a smaller amount of data per user.
The random forest classifier is an arbitrary choice. One can alternatively use a
different linear or nonlinear classifier to pursue a higher classification performance. This
is left as future work. Other future tasks include the generalizability of the present
results to different types of fraudulent transactions, such as resale tickets, pornography,
and stolen items, and to different platforms. In particular, if a classifier trained with
test samples from fraudulent users of a particular type and normal users is effective at
detecting different types of fraud, the classifier will also be potentially useful for
detecting unknown types of fraudulent transactions. It is also a potentially relevant
question to assess the classification performance when one pools different types of
fraudulent as a single positive category to train a classifier.
Prior network-based fraud detection has employed either global or local network
properties to characterize nodes. Global network properties refer to those that require
the structure of the entire network for calculating a quantity for individual nodes, such
as the connected component [14,17,29], betweenness centrality [14–16], user’s
suspiciousness determined by belief propagation [20,21,27,30,31,33,35,36], dense
subgraphs including the case of communities [14,18,19,22–25], and k-core [26,32].
Although many of these methods have accrued a high classification performance, they
require the information about the entire network. Obtaining such data may be difficult
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Fig 7. Cycle probability for each user type. (a) Survival probability. (b)
Survival probability conditioned on CYPi > 0.
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Fig 8. ROC and PR curves when the normal users and those involved in
fictive transactions are classified. (a) ROC curves. (b) PR curves. Each thin line
corresponds to one of the 100 classifiers. The thick lines correspond to the average of
the 100 lines. The dashed lines correspond to the uniformly random classification.
when the network is large or rapidly evolving over time, thus potentially compromising
the computation speed, memory requirement, and the accuracy of the information on
the nodes and edges. Alternatively, other methods employed local network properties
such as the degree including the case of directed and/or weighted
networks [14–16,20,23,30,33,34,37,38], and the abundance of triangles and
quadrangles [20,37]. The use of local network properties may be advantageous in
industrial contexts, particularly to test sampled users, because local quantities can be
rapidly calculated given a seed node. Another reason for which we focused on local
properties was that we could not obtain the global network structure for computational
reasons. It should be noted that, while the use of global network properties in addition
to local ones may improve the classification accuracy [23], the present local method
attained a similar classification performance to those based on global network
properties, i.e., 0.880–0.986 in terms of the ROC AUC [14,17,20,21,35,36].
A prior study using data from the same marketplace, Mercari, aimed to distinguish
between desirable non-professional frequent sellers and undesirable professional
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Fig 9. Permutation importance of the features in the random forest
classifier. (a) 12 features. (b) 9 features. The bars indicate the average over the 100
classifiers. The error bars indicate standard deviation.
sellers [51]. The authors of Ref. [51] used information about user profiles, item
descriptions, and other behavioral data such as the number of purchases per day. In
contrast, we focused on local network features of the users (while a quantity similar to
WSPi was used as a feature in Ref. [51]). In addition, we used specific types of
fraudulent transactions, whereas the authors of Ref. [51] focused on problematic
transactions as a single broad category. Combining network and non-network features
may realize a better classification performance, which also warrants future work.
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